Reevaluation of Pemberton at Vicksburg by Malcolm G. Haynes

Author:Malcolm G. Haynes [Haynes, Malcolm G.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: ACW
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06T00:00:00+00:00

The Battle of Port Gibson

To secure his bridgehead and prevent counterattack, Grant needed to control the Bayou Pierre River. This required seizing Port Gibson, a town about seven miles from Grand Gulf, which controlled the bridges spanning the Bayou Pierre. Confederate hopes of containing Grant therefore rested on retaining control of Port Gibson—an area ideal for the defense due to its deep ravines that limited an attacker to two narrow avenues of approach—the Bruinsburg and Rodney roads. At Port Gibson, a defender should theoretically have possessed the ability to defend against an attacker two to three times his strength. Yet, despite these defensive advantages, Port Gibson fell to the Union forces after only one day of fighting.{124} The victory at the Battle of Port Gibson on May 1 meant the successful completion of Grant’s river crossing operation.

After the war, Johnston faulted Pemberton for failing to concentrate against Grant as ordered, citing two telegrams he sent to Pemberton as evidence. In the first, sent on May 1, Johnston wrote, “If Grant’s army lands on this side of the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on defeating it. For that object, you should unite your whole force.” In the second, sent on May 2, Johnston repeated this guidance: “If Grant crosses, unite all your troops to beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it.” Modern historians have generally agreed with Johnston, with one stating that Pemberton’s “wisest course would have been to...mass everything he could at Grand Gulf.” {125}As argued above, these historians fail to recognize that uniting the entire Confederate force would have merely amounted to a military gamble and exposed numerous key areas in Mississippi to Union offensives. Although Pemberton may have overreacted to Grierson’s raid, he did so because he had to defend against cavalry with less mobile infantry troops. He attempted to correct this fault before Grant landed on April 30. In fact, the primary sources demonstrate that Pemberton began to recognize the threat of an attack south of Vicksburg no later than April 23.{126} He merely lacked the forces necessary to defend against it and the threat to his rear effectively.

On April 23, Pemberton sent the following to General Stevenson, commander of the three division strong second district at Vicksburg: “I consider it essential that a communication...be made, by the shortest practicable route, to Grand Gulf.” He further elaborated that, “…all troops not necessary to hold the works [at Vicksburg] should be held as a movable force, either for Warrenton or Grand Gulf.” On April 28, he ordered Stevenson to “hold 5,000 men in readiness to move to Grand Gulf, and on the requisition of Brigadier-General Bowen move them.” This would double the force at Grand Gulf, putting the equivalent of two divisions there. Additionally, Pemberton was arranging to send another brigade-sized force of 2,000-3,000 men from Jackson. Nevertheless, despite Pemberton’s efforts, Bowen fought the battle of Port Gibson without the full complement of additional forces Pemberton intended.{127}

Bowen never requested the 5,000 men from Stevenson as Pemberton ordered, for reasons that remain unclear.

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